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Abstract 
This study explores the EU’s foreign policy behaviour. More specifically, it focuses on the 
foreign policy objectives that are used by the EU in order to justify the imposition of economic 
sanctions. International relations theories disagree on the extent to which EU foreign policy 
objectives are driven by liberal-democratic norms and values in relation to member state 
security interests. This article examines how the EU’s economic sanctions policy relates to the 
theoretical debate on EU foreign policy objectives. It therefore investigates the stated objectives 
for all autonomous EU economic sanctions regimes that are currently in place. The official 
Council Decisions imposing or amending these sanctions regimes indicate that the EU more 
often uses normative motives to vindicate its use of economic sanctions. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is often referred to as a sui generis actor in international politics as 
European integration has become deeply institutionalized in both supranational and 
intergovernmental ways (Karns, Mingst & Stiles, 2015). Member states have committed 
themselves to increased cooperation, interdependency and ever deepening integration. The 
commitment and level of authority that has been and continues to be transferred from the 
member states to community institutions is unique and unparalleled by any other international 
organization. However, member states have been more reluctant in handing over national 
sovereignty to EU institutions in the field of foreign relations. Subsequently, EU foreign policy 
behaviour is widely debated in academic literature and scholars remain divided on EU foreign 
policy and its objectives. 
Economic sanctions are an important component of EU foreign policy because the EU’s 
toolkit in this area mainly exists of economic means. Similar to EU foreign policy in general, 
the objectives of the EU’s use of economic sanctions are also disputed. Many functionalist and 
constructivist scholars consider the EU to be a unique entity whose foreign policy behaviour is 
primarily driven by normative motives (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2013; Sjursen & Rosén, 2017). 
The EU thus contradicts the more self-interested state actors in the international arena. On the 
other hand, the intergovernmentalist and neoliberalist approaches stress the intergovernmental 
nature of EU foreign policy decision-making and highlight the importance of member state 
interests in determining the EU’s sanctions policy (Moravcsik, 1993; Krotz & Maher, 2011). In 
this sense, EU foreign policy is a mere sum of the member states’ economic and security 
interests. These different paradigms will be discussed in detail in the literature review hereafter. 
Understanding EU foreign policy behaviour and its use of economic power is relevant 
for both political scientists and policy-makers. As such, this study aims to contribute to the 
current knowledge on the EU’s use of economic power. The inquiry examines EU economic 
sanctions policy and the applicability of the above-mentioned metatheories to the formally 
stated objectives of EU sanctions regimes. It will do so by studying all EU economic sanctions 
regimes that are currently in place. Accordingly, this study focuses on the following research 
question: Does the European Union more often call upon normative or security related 
motives to justify its economic sanctions policy? In order to further understand EU foreign 
policy behaviour, EU decision-making and the use of economic power it is important to explore 
previous research on these topics. 
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2. Literature review 
This section discusses the relevant literature on the EU as an actor in international politics, EU 
decision-making and EU foreign policy behaviour. The conflicting views of the main theories 
result in the central puzzle of this study. 
2.1 Neo-functionalism and neoliberal institutionalism 
EU integration is often studied and explained by theories of neo-functionalism and neoliberal 
institutionalism. Neo-functionalism builds on the foundations of functionalism, a normative 
theory arguing that integration in different policy areas leads to the foundation of different 
organisations assigned with specific tasks with an end goal of eliminating war (Mitrany, 1948; 
Lelieveldt & Princen, 2013, p. 35). Thus, the form of any organisation follows directly from its 
specific function. Neo-functionalism explains European cooperation by the willingness of states 
to cooperate in a specific policy area, thereby enhancing their economic gains and setting in 
motion a process of delegating more tasks to the supranational level (Haas, 1958; Haas, 1961; 
Karns, Mingst & Stiles, 2015; Schmitter, 2005). In this regard, EU institutions have a functional 
purpose and can be seen as actors in their own right, acting independently from member states 
and their material and security interests. 
Andrew Moravcsik (1993, p. 475) criticizes neo-functionalism on the grounds that it is 
apolitical. Instead, he argues that EU member states pool and delegate sovereignty to 
supranational institutions by weighing the expected benefits of collective bargaining by pooling 
authority against the political risks of handing over sovereignty (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 475). 
Many neoliberal institutionalists also take a more state-centric standpoint and argue that 
institutions provide a channel for repeated interaction in which participating states act as 
rational utility-maximizers (Keohane, 1982; Keohane & Martin, 1995; Axelrod & Keohane, 
1985). According to a neoliberal reasoning EU institutions are likely to be intergovernmental. 
It follows that decision-making in the EU is likely dominated by member states and their 
interests (Keohane, 1982). Following a neo-functional approach, on the other hand, the EU’s 
many specific institutions should be regarded as actors in their own right which organize and 
regulate cooperation in specific policy areas. 
EU institutions have both neoliberal and neo-functional features. The European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice are good instances of the latter, whereas the 
European Council and the Council of Ministers better exemplify intergovernmentalism in the 
EU. The European Council and especially the Council of Ministers are the key institutions in 
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the decision-making process concerning EU foreign policy and the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) in particular (Ugirashebuja, Ruhangisa, Ottervanger & Cuyvers, 2017, 
p. 197; Krotz & Maher, 2011). In many fields of the EU’s external relations the Council of 
Ministers can decide without consulting the European Parliament. Moreover, the European 
Commission does not have the right of initiative (Ugirashebuja et al., 2011, p. 89). The 
dominant position of these mainly intergovernmental EU institutions shows the reluctance of 
member states to hand over sovereignty in the field of foreign policy (Krotz & Maher, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the European Commission plays a significant role in non-CFSP foreign 
relations, for example in negotiating trade agreements on behalf of the EU (Ugirashebuja et al., 
2017, p. 197). Also, some scholars maintain that in the EU ‘[s]overeignty is pooled, in the sense 
that, in many areas, states’ legal authority over internal and external affairs is transferred to the 
community as a whole, authorizing action through procedures not involving state vetoes’ 
(Keohane, 2002, p. 748; Hoffmann, 1987). Europe’s movement away from the classical 
conception of sovereignty towards pooled sovereignty is likely reflected in the EU’s 
geopolitical role and interests (Keohane, 2002). Such a way of looking at the EU relates more 
closely to the functionalist argument that EU institutions are unique and norm-driven actors that 
have moved away from notions such as self-interest and state survival (Haas, 1958; Moravcsik, 
1993; Mearsheimer, 1994). 
2.2 EU foreign policy decision-making 
The functionalist and liberal intergovernmentalist opposing views of the EU’s ‘actorness’ result 
in different insights in EU foreign policy decision-making. Due to the intergovernmental nature 
of the European Council and the Council of Ministers, liberal intergovernmentalists and realists 
consider the EU’s CFSP objectives to be a mere sum of member state interests (Krotz & Maher, 
2011). However, functionalists and constructivists maintain that the EU has moved away from 
the classic notion of state sovereignty through a process of integration and socialization, making 
it a unique actor with normative foreign policy objectives (Keohane, 2002; Haas, 1958; Sjursen 
& Rosén, 2017).  
Taking into account the actual decision-making process concerning the EU’s CFSP, 
liberal intergovernmentalists and realists, on the one hand, and functionalists and 
constructivists, on the other hand, both have adequate grounds on which they explain EU 
behaviour. The decision-making process concerning EU foreign policy, CFSP and the use of 
sanctions is mainly dominated by the Council of Ministers, which is considered to be a largely 
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intergovernmental institution (Ugirashebuja et al., 2017). Thus, intergovernmentalists and 
realists see the Council of Ministers as a channel through which EU member states advocate 
policies in support of their national interests. EU foreign policy is not directed by supranational 
institutions but is instead the result of bargaining between member states, agreed on the basis 
of the lowest common denominator (Moravcsik, 1993; Sjursen & Rosén, 2017; Hyde-Price, 
2006). EU foreign policy can be seen as a sum of member state interests. 
It must be noted that the High Representative of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), who is simultaneously Vice President of the European Commission, is also the chair 
of the Council of Ministers when foreign affairs are being discussed (Foreign Affairs Council) 
(Ugirashebuja et al., 2017, p. 89). Following a functionalist reasoning, the institutionalized 
position of the High Representative of the EEAS and Vice President of the European 
Commission in EU foreign policy decision-making allows for normative influence in the largely 
intergovernmental Council of Ministers. Furthermore, constructivist argue that the member 
states and EU institutions are socialized by the liberal-democratic norms and values that are so 
deeply embedded in the EU (Sjursen & Rosén, 2017). Therefore, the functionalist and 
constructivist approaches diminish the influence of national interests and stress the importance 
of European norms and values in determining EU foreign policy objectives (Manners, 2002). 
2.3 Constructivism and realism 
Conflicting stances towards the EU’s ‘actorness’ result in different insights in its foreign policy 
behaviour and objectives. The key element of this debate is the extent to which EU foreign 
policy objectives are dictated by liberal-democratic norms and values in relation to its member 
states’ material and security interests. The constructivist and realist metatheories dominate the 
debate on EU foreign policy objectives.  
One the one hand, many constructivist scholars believe the EU to be a normative actor, 
in the sense that liberal-democratic norms and values rather than member state interests dictate 
EU foreign policy behaviour (Manners, 2002; Haukkala, 2008). Whereas functionalists focus 
on institutionalisation, constructivists believe that institutions are able to socialize actors 
through evolving similar understandings, a sense of community and a sense of common purpose 
(Sjursen & Rosén, 2017, p. 22; Meyer, 2006). Both approaches stress the importance of 
institutionalized norms and values that gradually enhance their power over states in certain 
policy areas, thereby minimizing the influence of member state interests (Gordon, 1997, p. 77). 
EU foreign policy behaviour is therefore likely to be norm-driven rather than interest-driven. 
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On the other hand, realists and intergovernmentalists maintain a heavier emphasis on 
state interests because ‘institutions cannot work unless common goals are shared’ (Gordon, 
1997, p. 78). Under this perspective, the member states clearly have the initiative since both 
approaches stress national interests and the inter-state bargaining process underlying EU 
foreign policy (Moravcsik, 1993; Sjursen & Rosén, 2017; Hyde-Price, 2006). This approach 
fits the intergovernmental decision-making process in the Council of Ministers. In this sense, 
the EU can be seen as an intergovernmental institution that uses its (mainly economic) power 
in order to protect and promote the interests of its member states rather than as a sui generis 
actor that promotes liberal-democratic norms and values in their own right. EU foreign policy 
objectives are dictated by its member states’ national interests. Since states seek to enhance 
security, ensure survival and maximize gains, EU foreign policy behaviour is likely to be 
security-driven (Mearsheimer, 1994; Keohane, 1982). 
2.4 Hard and soft economic power 
Next, it is necessary to explore the notion of economic power because the EU’s toolkit primarily 
consists of economic means (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006). Power in its broadest sense can be 
understood as the ability to influence the outcome of events (Heywood, 2011, p. 210). Firstly, 
power can be understood in terms of capabilities. A state’s power can thus be defined by 
material factors such as the strength of its armed forces, natural recourses, technology, 
population size or the size and strength of its economy (Nye, 1990; Barnett & Duvall, 2005). 
Secondly, there is a relational aspect to the concept of power, as states use their resources in 
order to influence the behaviour of others (Holsti, 1964). An often quoted notion of power that 
clearly captures this relational element is Robert Dahl’s (1957, pp. 202-203) assertion that ‘A 
has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise 
do’. The relational aspect of power is mainly concerned with influence, whereas the capability 
element focuses on the strength of an actor. Evidently, both aspects are closely related. 
Power in the classical realist sense is coercive in nature since capabilities are used in 
order to control the behaviour of others. However, this classic notion of power has come under 
pressure because of an increasingly interdependent world. Declining costs of transportation and 
communication contributed to growing cross-border flows of goods, services and information. 
As a result, national economies intertwined, thereby making the use of traditional power 
resources more costly and less rewarding (Nye, 1990, pp. 160-161). Hence, Joseph Nye (1990, 
p. 167) argues that in today’s world it is more important for states to make their power seem 
legitimate in the eyes of others. Nye therefore distinguishes between hard and soft power. He 
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defines hard power as the ability of an actor to influence another through the use military or 
economic threats or rewards (Nye, 1990; 2005). Soft power, on the other hand, focuses on an 
actors’ ability to shape the preferences of others by attraction rather than through coercion (Nye, 
1990; 2005). Economic resources can contribute to both hard power and soft power. This is 
especially the case for the EU, due to the size of the single market in combination with the 
collective character of its trade policy (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006, p. 907). 
2.5 Economic power as a tool of statecraft 
Some scholars maintain that the EU is a normative actor that is largely relying on soft power 
(Manners, 2002). The EU’s use of conditionality (offering closer economic cooperation in 
return for effective implementation of liberal-democratic reforms) can be considered to be a 
form of soft power. However, there is growing scepticism on the effectiveness of conditionality 
and the EU’s use of soft power in general (Hafner-Burton, 2005). Also, the use of conditionality 
can be seen as blunt coercion, whereas ‘carrots and sticks’ are used to enforce European norms 
and standards on trading partners (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006, p. 920). Therefore, realist and 
intergovernmentalist scholars maintain that the EU acts in a self-interested way since it uses its 
economic leverage to protect and promote the material and security interests of its member 
states (Keohane, 2002; Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006). Hard power rather than soft power best 
fits this understanding of the EU’s CFSP because the EU’s vast economic power allows it to 
coerce others to its benefit. It should be noted that the use of hard power does not rule out norm-
driven EU foreign policy objectives. 
One way in which the EU is able use its economic leverage is through the use of 
economic sanctions. Economic sanctions are a tool of statecraft and can be used to coerce 
another actor for political purposes (Baldwin & Pape, 1998; Vines, 2012). However, the use of 
sanctions by the EU is disputed and so is the effectiveness of sanctions in general. Some 
scholars claim sanctions to be ineffective, others maintain they are most likely to be effective 
at the threat-stage, whereas some other scholars have articulated a series of conditions that 
explain the success or failure of sanctions once in place (Hovi, Huseby & Sprinz, 2005; 
Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott, 1985; Cooper Drury, 1998; Morgan & Schwebach, 1996). More 
importantly, just like the EU’s CFSP in general, scholars disagree on the objectives of EU 
sanctions policy (Sjursen & Rosén, 2017; Portela, 2005; Becher, 2004). In line with the foreign 
policy debate mentioned before, constructivist scholars argue that the EU imposes economic 
measures for normative policy objectives (Manners, 2002; Portela, 2005). Again, realists stress 
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the importance of member state security interests. They assert that sanctions are imposed in 
support of member state strategic interests (Portela, 2005; Becher, 2004). 
2.6 Field of study 
Due to the size of its economy, the EU relies mainly on the use of economic power in its foreign 
policy. The EU uses its economic leverage in both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ ways (Nye, 1990; 2005). 
Whereas the power of attraction is more visible in the EU’s use of conditionality in for example 
the ENP, the use of economic sanctions is a better instance of hard power. Power in this sense 
is coercive in nature: the EU uses its economic leverage in order to force another actor to change 
its behaviour by using sanctions (Holsti, 1964). Thus, sanctions are economic tools used by the 
EU for political purposes (Baldwin & Pape, 1998). This study seeks to explore the EU’s use of 
hard power through the use of economic sanctions. 
As shown in the above, scholars disagree on what objectives the EU seeks to achieve 
with its CFSP and the use of economic sanctions in particular. Whereas many constructivist 
and functionalist scholars see the EU as a sui generis actor who’s foreign policy behaviour is 
guided by socialized and institutionalized liberal-democratic norms and values, many realists 
and intergovernmentalists claim that EU foreign policy behaviour is guided by its member 
states’ security interests. These schools of thought have opposing interpretations of EU foreign 
policy practice, including its sanctions record. The different theoretical discourses basically 
disagree on the extent to which EU sanctions objectives are driven by its member states’ 
security interests in relation to liberal-democratic norms and values (Sjursen & Rosén, 2017; 
Becher, 2004). As this study aims to contribute to the current knowledge on EU foreign policy 
behaviour and the use of economic sanctions in particular, it will test which paradigm more 
often vindicates economic sanctions imposed by the EU. Thus, coming back to the research 
question stated in the introduction: Does the European Union more often call upon 
normative or security related motives to justify its economic sanctions policy? 
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3. Theoretical framework 
This section briefly discusses the model that is used in this research and wherefrom it was 
derived. Next, the model is combined with the theories discussed in the literature review, 
resulting in the six hypotheses that are tested in order to answer the research question. 
3.1 Portela’s model 
This study uses a model from Clara Portela in order to test the hypotheses. Her classification is 
based on the work of others. Buzan (1991, pp. 19-20) distinguishes ‘political’ from ‘military’ 
security, thereby acknowledging the dual character of foreign policy objectives. Also, Wolfers 
(1962, pp. 73-76) differentiates between ‘milieu’ and ‘possession’ goals. ‘Milieu goals aim to 
shape the environment in which an actor operates, while possession goals further national 
interests’ (Portela, 2005, p. 88). Both scholars recognize the security relevance of objectives 
that go beyond more narrowly defined strategic aims. Thus, in examining the relationship 
between strategic rationales and normative components of EU sanctions objectives, Portela 
makes an interesting distinction between directly security related interests and indirectly 
security related interests (Portela, 2005). 
Sanctions objectives that are directly related to security comprise (1) the fight against 
terrorism, (2) the preservation of regional peace and stability, (3) the support of an ongoing 
peace process and (4) the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD’s) (Portela, 
2005, p. 92). Objectives indirectly related to security feature (1) the promotion of democracy 
and (2) the promotion of human rights (Portela, 2005, p. 92). These subcategories were derived 
from the EU’s ‘Basic Principles on the use of Restrictive Measures’ and the objectives of the 
CFSP in general (Portela, 2005, p. 91). In her study, Portela (2005, pp. 95-96) concluded that 
the EU had imposed sanctions for directly as well as indirectly security related objectives in the 
period 1987-2003. 
3.2 Portela’s adapted model  
Portela’s classification is interesting and useful because it concretizes abstract concepts as self-
interest and liberal-democratic norms and values. She uses it to test the relationship between 
strategic and normative objectives of the EU’s sanctions policy. The directly security related 
objectives are used to test strategic security-driven objectives, whereas the indirectly security 
related objectives help to identify a more norm-driven use of sanctions. Her distinction between 
directly and indirectly security related objectives overlaps with the dividing line in the 
theoretical debate in the literature review. Realist theory relates closely to Portela’s directly 
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security related objectives since both approaches stress state survival and strategic interests. 
Indirectly security related objectives fit a constructivist understanding of EU foreign policy 
because in both instances the objectives are normative in nature. 
This study takes it one step further and tries to use theory in order to match the realist 
vision of EU foreign policy to an intergovernmental way of looking at the EU’s ‘actorness’. 
Also, the constructivist conviction that EU foreign policy is norm-driven is linked to a 
functionalist vision of the EU as a sui generis actor. This inquiry not only uses Portela’s model 
to test whether EU foreign policy is predominantly norm- or security-driven, but also connects 
it to theories on the EU internal balance of power (between EU institutions and the member 
states). Portela’s model is used for two reasons. Firstly, it is a workable way to distinguish 
between a predominantly self-interested use of economic sanctions (directly related security 
objectives) and a more norm-driven sanctions policy (indirectly related security objectives). 
Thus, the model allows for the different paradigms to be studied in relation to EU economic 
sanctions policy. Secondly, it is in need of an update since it only covers sanctions until 2003. 
Building on Portela’s (2005) classification, there are three possible motives for the EU 
to implement economic sanctions. Firstly, the impetus can be directly security related (fight 
against terrorism, preservation of regional peace and stability, support of an ongoing peace 
process, non-proliferation of WMD’s). The fight against terrorism is understood as policy 
measures (economic sanctions) targeting terrorist organisations or individuals. Regional peace 
and stability is understood in terms of inter-state conflict. It therefore entails one state 
undermining the sovereignty of another. Ongoing peace processes may comprise peace treaties, 
cease-fires and armistices. The non-proliferation of WMD’s is understood as policy measures 
promotion the containment of nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological weapons. Secondly, 
the incentive can be indirectly security related (promotion of democracy, promotion of human 
rights). Promoting democracy and human rights is understood as using policy measures to 
punish other actors for any obstruction of the democratic process or involvement in the 
deterioration of the human rights situation in a state. Lastly, the objective of a sanctions regime 
can be both directly and indirectly related to security. 
3.3 The hypotheses  
Following a realist and intergovernmentalist approach, whether or not EU economic sanctions 
are imposed is determined by the bargaining process between rational and self-interested 
member states that are primarily concerned with survival. In this regard, the EU as a rational 
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collective actor is expected to primarily use sanctions in order to protect and promote its core 
security interests. Translated to Portela’s directly security related objectives, the realist and 
intergovernmentalist approaches expect the EU to use the promotion of regional peace and 
stability, the fight against terrorism, the support of an (ongoing) peace process and the non-
proliferation of WMD’s as reasons for imposing economic sanctions regimes. The following 
hypotheses can be derived from the realist and intergovernmentalist approaches. 
Realism and intergovernmentalism: Directly security related objectives  
Hypothesis 1a: The EU uses the promotion of regional peace and stability as a reason for 
imposing economic sanctions.  
Hypothesis 1b: The EU uses the fight against terrorism as a reason for imposing economic 
sanctions.  
Hypothesis 1c: The EU uses the support of an (ongoing) peace processes as a reason for 
imposing economic sanctions.  
Hypothesis 1d: The EU uses the non-proliferation of WMD’s as a reason for imposing 
economic sanctions. 
From a constructivist and functionalist point of view the EU is seen as a sui generis 
actor with deeply embedded liberal-democratic norms and values. Even though sanctions are 
implemented by a largely intergovernmental institution (the Council of Ministers), both 
paradigms emphasize the importance of institutionalized norms and values. Also, the Council’s 
meetings are headed by the High Representative of the EEAS who is also the Vice President of 
the European Commission, thereby allowing for ‘normative’ influence of supranational EU 
institutions on the decision-making process. To add, constructivists argue that member states 
have been socialized throughout the many years of integration, affecting and shaping their 
preferences in the process. Due to institutionalization and socialization of liberal-democratic 
norms and values, EU sanctions policy objectives are believed to be primarily normative in 
nature. With regard to Portela’s classification this means that the EU is expected to mainly use 
the promotion human rights and democracy as reasons for implementing economic sanctions. 
Thus, a constructivist and functionalist approach leads to the following hypotheses. 
Constructivism and functionalism: Indirectly security related objectives  
Hypothesis 2a: The EU uses the promotion of human rights as a reason for imposing economic 
sanctions.   
Hypothesis 2b: The EU uses the promotion of democracy as a reason for imposing economic 
sanctions. 
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4. Research design 
This section is a brief outline of the operationalization of the variables in this study and the 
methodology that is used in order to test the set of hypotheses. 
4.1 Operationalization 
As stated in the theoretical framework, this study builds on Portela’s model. The hypotheses 
expect the EU to use the four directly and two indirectly security related objectives to justify 
the imposition of economic sanctions. Thus, theory expects that whether or not sanctions are 
imposed depends on whether or not one or more of Portela’s six objectives are applicable to a 
possible target state. Therefore, the directly and indirectly security related objectives are the 
independent variables in this study. The directly security related objectives entail (1a) the 
promotion of regional peace and stability, (1b) the fight against terrorism, (1c) the support of a 
peace process and (1d) the non-proliferation of WMD’s (Portela, 2005, p. 92). The indirectly 
security related objectives comprise (2a) the promotion of human rights and (2b) the promotion 
of democracy (Portela, 2005, p. 92). The implementation of a sanctions regime is the dependent 
variable in this research. 
Portela’s classification is used to categorize sanctions regimes by their objectives. The 
six categories are not exclusive because more than one objective can apply to a single sanctions 
regime. A sanctions regime is considered to be driven by directly security related objectives if 
hypothesis 1a, 1b, 1c or 1d is met or any combination thereof. If hypothesis 2a and/or 2b is met, 
a sanctions regime is deemed to be motivated by indirectly security related objectives. A 
sanctions regime is believed to be driven by both directly and indirectly security related 
objectives if any of hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c or 1d are met in combination with 2a and/or 2b. 
Hypothesis 1a is met if a sanctions regime is instated due to the violation or undermining 
of the sovereignty or territorial integrity of a state. Hypothesis 1b is met in case a sanctions 
regime is imposed due to EU concerns about (the alleged state-support of) terrorist 
organizations or individuals. Hypothesis 1c is met if the duration of a sanctions regime is 
coupled to the success of (negotiations on) a peace agreement or cease-fire. Hypothesis 1c is 
also met in case economic sanctions are used to force another state to negotiate on a peace 
agreement. Hypothesis 1d is met if a sanctions regime is imposed in relation to the containment, 
control or use of biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological weapons. Hypothesis 2a is met if 
a sanctions regime is instated in reaction to the worsening human rights situation in another 
state. Hypothesis 2b is met if a sanctions regime is imposed because of any obstruction of the 
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democratic process in another state, ‘including non-violent coups d’etat as well as cancellations 
of elections or refusal to hand over power to elected representatives’ (Portela, 2005, p. 92). 
4.2 Methodology 
This study uses a comparative approach to EU economic sanctions regimes that are currently 
in place. The unit of analysis is a sanctions regime, often referred to by the EU as restrictive 
measures. Multiple sanctions regimes can be in place against one target state. A sanctions 
regime has to be imposed by the EU autonomously since this study focuses specifically on EU 
behaviour. This excludes sanctions that were imposed by the United Nations (UN) or the UN 
and the EU together. Furthermore, sanctions regimes that consists of solely diplomatic measures 
are excluded from this research because they do not entail the use of any economic means. If a 
sanctions regime is adapted once in place, it will be coded as a new sanctions regime only in 
case additional objectives are stated. In case a sanctions regime is merely prolonged or amended 
without clearly stated additional objectives, it is not coded as a new sanctions regime. 
With regard to the practicality and feasibility of the project, only sanctions regimes that 
are currently in place are examined. The sanctionsmap.eu website is used in order to select the 
current autonomous EU sanctions regimes. This is an official and up-to-date EU website listing 
all restrictive measures currently implemented by the EU. The starting date and end date (in 
case a sanctions regime was adapted and additional motives were stated) are also incorporated 
into the research in order to identify possible trends over time. Special attention will be paid to 
pre and post 1st December 2009 economic sanctions regimes. On this date the Lisbon Treaty 
came into force. This treaty introduced the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy (who heads the Foreign Affairs Council), thereby possibly enlarging 
normative influence on the decision-making process (Cuyvers, 2017, p. 89). 
Unfortunately, there is no clear insight in the Council’s actual decision-making process 
concerning the imposition of a sanctions regime. The EU’s real foreign policy objectives are 
therefore hard to determine. Hence, this inquiry focuses on the sanctions regimes themselves 
since the EU’s objectives and priorities can be determined by exploring the actual record 
(Portela, 2005, p. 87; Smith, 2003). More specifically, the official Council Decisions regarding 
the imposition of and amendments to EU restrictive measures are studied. These texts will be 
analysed in order to test the six hypotheses. This method is applicable to answer the research 
question because Council Decisions clearly state the formal reasons for imposing or amending 
restrictive measures. On the first page of these Council Decisions the reasons for imposing 
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sanctions are clearly articulated under ‘Whereas: ...’ or in the first article. These exact wordings 
are the result of the Councils’ internal bargaining process and therefore reflect the importance 
of security interests in relation to liberal-democratic norms and values for imposing restrictive 
measures. 
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5. Empirical analysis 
This section briefly discusses the overall findings and examines whether or not the six 
hypotheses were met. 
5.1 Overall results 
A total of twenty-five sanctions regimes that are currently in place were instated by the EU 
autonomously. In the cases of Syria, Russia and Myanmar the sanctions regimes were amended 
once in place together with clearly stated additional or amended EU objectives. In these cases, 
the amended sanctions regimes were incorporated into the results as separate regimes. Also, 
there are three sanctions regimes in place against Ukraine, one of which specifically targets the 
Crimea. This sanctions regime was imposed in reaction to the Russian annexation of the 
peninsula, but is formally targeting Ukraine since the EU does not recognize the Crimea as a 
subject of the Russian Federation. The other two sanctions regimes are also related to the 
ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Also, it must be noted that one of the EU’s sanctions regimes 
specifically targets terrorist organizations and individuals. This regime is not targeting a 
specific state. Still, it was included in the results since the EU is using its economic power in 
order to compel or deter other international actors. 
Furthermore, four of the twenty-five sanctions regimes were adopted by the EU in 
reaction to UN Security Council Resolutions. Even though these sanctions regimes were 
formally adopted autonomously, the mere function of them was to prohibit the satisfying of 
certain claims in relation to transactions that have been prohibited or are affected by UN 
Security Council measures. These four sanctions regimes (targeting Haiti, Libya, Montenegro 
and Serbia) were excluded from the research. Also, a sanctions regime targeting Moldova in 
order to stimulate a political settlement of the conflict concerning the Transnistrian region was 
excluded from the study. The imposed sanctions regime does not entail the use of any economic 
means as it only imposes travel restrictions on certain members of the Transnistrian leadership. 
Therefore, this case gives no insights in the EU’s use of economic power. All autonomous EU 
sanctions regimes that are currently in place are listed in the appendix. The list includes the 
sanctions regimes imposed on Haiti, Libya, Montenegro, Serbia and Moldova. 
A total of thirty-three objectives were explicitly mentioned in Council Decisions or 
Common Positions imposing or amending the twenty sanctions regimes that were incorporated 
in this research. Figure 1 gives an overview of the directly and indirectly security related foreign 
policy objectives and the extent to which the EU’s current economic sanctions regimes seek to 
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achieve them. Figure 1 also distinguishes between economic sanctions that were imposed 
before and after 1st December 2009, the date the Lisbon Treaty came into force and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs was introduced. 
Figure 1: Objectives of EU economic sanctions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firstly, it is striking that the sanctions regimes seek to achieve a total of only eleven 
directly security related objectives compared to a total of twenty-two indirectly security 
objectives. Secondly, looking at the pre and post Lisbon Treaty sanctions objectives, clearly the 
EU has sought to achieve more objectives after. This is also due to the number of sanctions 
incorporated into the research, since only six sanctions regimes were imposed before December 
2009. One has to keep in mind that only sanctions regimes that are currently still in place were 
incorporated in the research. Sanctions regimes that were imposed and have already been lifted 
entirely were excluded. This likely influenced the results. Before discussing the results in more 
detail, the six hypotheses are tested in the next paragraphs. 
5.2 Directly security related hypotheses 
The first four hypotheses are based on the realist and liberal intergovernmentalist approaches 
to EU foreign policy decision-making and coincide with Portela’s directly security related 
objectives. Hypothesis 1a states that the EU uses the promotion of regional peace and stability 
in order to justify the imposition of economic sanctions. Figure 1 shows that the EU uses 
economic sanctions to promote regional peace and stability in six instances. Regional peace and 
stability is stated as an objective in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and Russia. 
Three sanctions regimes were imposed on Ukraine in reaction to actions undermining or 
 Pre 1-12-2009 Post 1-12-2009 Total 
Regional Peace and Stability 0 6 6 
Terrorism 1 0 1 
Support of Peace Process 0 3 3 
WMD’s 0 1 1 
Directly Security Related 1 10 11 
Promotion of Human Rights 5 9 14 
Promotion of Democracy 4 4 8 
Indirectly Security Related 9 13 22 
Total 10 23 33 
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threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, one of which 
specifically targets the Crimea. Economic sanctions were imposed on Russia for its 
involvement in the destabilisation of the situation of Ukraine in July 2014. In June 2015 the 
sanctions regime was adapted and the EU explicitly linked the duration of the restrictive 
measures to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements. In the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the promotion of regional peace and stability is accompanied by the support of a 
peace agreement, being the 1995 Dayton/Paris General Framework Agreement for Peace. Even 
though five of the six sanctions regimes are related to the conflict in Ukraine (and might 
therefore overemphasize the importance of regional peace and stability), the results confirm the 
expectations and hypothesis 1a is met. 
Hypothesis 1b asserts that economic sanctions are used to combat terrorism. Interesting 
in this respect is that the EU has one autonomous sanctions regime targeting terrorism in 
general. The sanctions regime was instated in December 2001 and incorporates the freezing of 
assets of terrorist individuals, groups and entities. In none of the other sanctions regimes 
targeting states does the EU refer to (the state support of) terrorist organizations or individuals. 
Also in the Council Decisions concerning the sanctions regime targeting Syria terrorism is not 
mentioned as an objective. The EU has imposed a separate sanctions regime against ISIS and 
Al Qaida. This regime was excluded from the research because it was adopted in reaction to 
UN Security Council Resolutions regarding both organizations. Even though there is only one 
autonomous EU sanctions regime combatting terrorism, it targets about thirty individuals as 
well as fourteen groups and entities. Hypothesis 1b is therefore confirmed as well. 
Hypothesis 1c expects the EU to use the support of (ongoing) peace processes as an 
objective in order to justify the imposition economic sanctions. Figure 1 shows that in three 
instances the EU either promotes a peace process or stimulates compliance with a peace 
agreement. In the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Russia sanctions were instated and 
amended to simultaneously promote the implementation of a peace agreement and regional 
peace and stability. In the Bosnia and Herzegovinian instance this was stated explicitly in 
Council Decision 2011/173/CFSP: ‘(...) restrictive measures should be imposed against certain 
natural and legal persons whose activities undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
constitutional order and international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, seriously threaten 
the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina or undermine the Dayton/Paris General 
Framework Agreement for Peace and the Annexes thereto.’ The economic sanctions that were 
imposed against Burundi in October 2015 enforced compliance with the Arusha Agreement for 
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Peace and Reconciliation of 2000. The EU also sought to promote human rights and democracy. 
Thus, the EU’s entrance angle to this sanctions regime seems to differ from the other two cases. 
In Burundi it is clearly about a domestic struggle for power, whereas in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the Ukrainian conflict (Russia) other states play a more significant role in the conflict. 
Either way, economic sanctions were used in order to support (ongoing) peace processes. 
Accordingly, hypothesis 1c is confirmed by the results. 
Hypothesis 1d states that economic sanctions are used in order to support the non-
proliferation of WMD’s. The results in Figure 1 show that this was the case in only one of the 
twenty sanctions regimes incorporated in the research. Economic sanctions were first imposed 
on Syria in May 2011 due to EU concerns about the human rights situation in the country. From 
December 2013 onwards, Council Decisions regarding amendments to the already imposed 
sanctions mentioned the dismantling of Syria’s chemical weapons as a reason for expanding 
the sanctions regime. For example, Council Decision 2013/760/CFSP states that the imposed 
sanctions are meant to stimulate ‘the activities undertaken by the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for the elimination of the chemical weapons in 
Syria’. Hypothesis 1d is met since economic sanctions are used in order to promote the non-
proliferation of WMD’s, albeit just once. UN and EU sanctions are also in place against North 
Korea and Iran for their nuclear weapons programs. These measures were excluded from the 
research because they were not implemented by the EU autonomously. 
5.3 Indirectly security related hypotheses 
The last two hypotheses are based on a constructivist and functionalist approach to EU foreign 
policy decision-making. These paradigms consider the EU to be a normative actor and coincide 
with Portela’s indirectly security related objectives. Hypothesis 2a asserts that the EU justifies 
its use of economic sanctions by using the promotion of human rights as an objective. Figure 1 
shows that the EU imposed economic sanctions with human rights objectives in fourteen 
instances. A worsening human rights situation in another state was the most frequent reason for 
the EU to impose economic sanctions. Only two of the three sanctions regimes targeting 
Ukraine, sanctions against Russia for its involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, sanctions 
against Bosnia and Herzegovina and sanctions targeting terrorism did not involve human rights 
considerations. In all other cases, economic sanctions were justified by a deteriorating human 
rights situation in another state. Human rights objectives were often accompanied by the 
promotion of democracy. The EU’s reaction (in terms of autonomous economic sanctions) to 
the Arab Spring also seems to be primarily focused on human rights and democracy promotion 
20 
 
rather than strategic rationales, as exemplified by the regimes that were imposed against 
Tunisia, Egypt and Syria in 2011. All in all, the results clearly confirm hypothesis 2a. 
Hypothesis 2b expects the EU to use democracy promotion as a reason to impose 
economic sanctions. The results in Figure 1 show that democracy promotion was stated by the 
EU as an objective in eight of the twenty sanctions regimes incorporated in this research. Most 
striking is that in every instance the promotion of democracy is accompanied by EU concerns 
about the human rights situation in a state. In the cases of Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Belarus, 
Guinea, Tunisia, Egypt and Venezuela economic sanctions were imposed in order to coerce 
authorities to uphold democratic principles and respect human rights. As indicated earlier, EU 
sanctions targeting Burundi were instated in order to promote democracy and human rights 
while simultaneously enforcing a peace agreement. Evidently, the EU has sought to promote 
democracy through the use of economic sanctions in multiple occasions. Hypothesis 2b is thus 
confirmed as well. 
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6. Discussion of the results 
Now that the hypotheses have been tested, the results will be discussed in more detail. The 
practical and theoretical implications of the findings will be touched upon as well.  
6.1 Patterns in sanctions objectives 
It makes sense that all hypotheses were met because the six objectives were derived by Portela 
from officially stated EU foreign policy objectives (Portela, 2005, p. 91). More relevant for this 
study is the relationship between the directly and indirectly security related objectives. Figure 
2 shows the amount of sanctions regimes that were instated for directly security related 
objectives, indirectly security related objectives or a combination of both objectives. Directly 
security related objectives were used by the EU to justify the imposition of six economic 
sanctions regimes. Two of these six regimes are driven by more than just one of Portela’s 
directly security related objectives. In both instances sanctions were imposed to support 
regional peace and stability and the implementation of a peace process. 
A total of eleven sanctions regimes were imposed for solely indirectly security related 
motives. In seven of these cases, concerns about democracy and the human rights situation in a 
country justified the EU’s economic sanctions. Only three of the twenty economic sanctions 
regimes were instated to promote a combination of directly and indirectly security related 
objectives. These regimes were imposed by the EU on Syria (December 2013), Ukraine (March 
2014) and Burundi (October 2015). The inequality in the amount of economic sanctions that 
were imposed for directly and indirectly security related objectives is noteworthy, even though 
the total number of cases incorporated in this study is relatively small. When taking into account 
that five of the six directly security related sanctions regimes are related to a single conflict in 
Ukraine, the imbalance is even more striking. 
Figure 2: Number of EU sanctions regimes and their objectives 
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Figure 3 is a simplified display of the results in Figure 2. Also, the pre and post Lisbon 
Treaty distinction is added in Figure 3. The number of autonomous economic sanctions regimes 
that were imposed by the EU is clearly bigger after December 2009 than before. Still, this does 
not necessarily mean that the EU became a more active user of economic sanctions after the 
Lisbon Treaty came into force. The deviation might be caused by the fact that only sanctions 
regimes that are currently still in place were incorporated in the research. When looking at the 
sanctions regimes’ objectives, the use of economic sanctions for indirectly security related 
objectives seems stable over time. On the other hand, there seems to be some sort of trend 
concerning the directly security related objectives. Only one sanctions regime was instated to 
promote directly security related objectives before 1st December 2009, whereas eight regimes 
were imposed to promote (partly) directly security related objectives after December 2009. Also 
in this instance one has to keep in mind that five of these are related to the Ukrainian conflict. 
Still, it seems that directly security related objectives became more important in the EU’s 
economic sanctions policy. 
Figure 3: Objectives of EU economic sanctions regimes  
 
 
 
 
6.2 Theoretical implications 
The EU uses economic sanctions in order to promote directly security related objectives, 
indirectly security related objectives or a combination thereof. When going back to the 
theoretical foundations of this study, both the realist-intergovernmentalist approach and the 
constructivist-functionalist approach seem to explain EU sanctions policy to a certain degree. 
Firstly, realists and intergovernmentalists stress the importance of member state 
interests and bargaining in EU policy making. Since the member states are mainly concerned 
with survival, the EU was expected to primarily use economic power in order to protect and 
promote core European security interests. These paradigms were linked to Portela’s directly 
security related foreign policy objectives. Results show that the EU used these security concerns 
to justify the use of economic sanctions on multiple occasions. The threat of instability close to 
 Pre 1-12-2009 Post 1-12-2009 Total 
Directly Security Related 1 5 6 
Indirectly Security Related 5 6 11 
Both 0 3 3 
Total  6 14 20 
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its borders led the EU to impose economic sanctions on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and 
Russia. Also, sanctions were imposed on Syria because of its chemical weapons arsenal. Even 
though sanctions were also imposed on Syria due to human rights violations, there is most likely 
a more strategic rationale to EU sanctions targeting the Assad regime. The sanctions combatting 
terrorism also clearly reflect EU security concerns. All in all, the findings confirm the realist 
and intergovernmentalist conviction that the EU’s economic sanctions policy is driven by 
security concerns of state-survival. 
Secondly, following the constructivist and functionalist approaches, the EU is regarded 
a sui generis actor driven by liberal-democratic norms and values rather than by member state 
interests. Institutionalization and socialization of EU member states have diminished the 
importance of material and strategic rationales and gave way to a more norm-driven foreign 
policy instead. In this study, normative foreign policy goals were linked to Portela’s indirectly 
security related objectives. The results show that normative concerns were a big enough 
incentive for the EU to impose economic sanctions in multiple instances. The EU often uses 
democracy and human rights promotion to vindicate economic sanctions regimes. The findings 
thus confirm the functionalist and constructivist vision of the EU as a normative actor, since 
EU economic sanctions policy seems to be driven by more than security concerns alone. 
In comparing theories on EU foreign policy and the relative importance of normative 
and self-interested foreign policy objectives, it seems that normative motives are a bigger 
incentive for the EU to impose economic sanctions autonomously. The results show that the 
EU more often called upon normative objectives to justify restrictive measures. It must be noted 
in this light that the promotion of liberal-democratic norms and values is also linked to 
European security interests in one way or another. There are also cases where normative 
objectives were combined with security-related motives. Still, the sanctions objectives were 
predominantly indirectly security related and therefore norm-driven. Current EU autonomous 
sanctions regimes indicate that the EU is more of a sui generis actor that is driven by normative 
motives in its use of economic sanctions than it is a rational collective actor that is driven solely 
by security interests. 
Furthermore, it is hard to make a clear distinction between the EU’s pre and post Lisbon 
Treaty sanctions policy. The Lisbon Treaty introduced the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as head of the Foreign Affairs Council. It was therefore 
expected to enlarge institutional normative influence on the largely intergovernmental decision-
making process. Even though the findings do not support a more norm-driven sanctions policy 
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after December 2009, there were some instances in which Council documents explicitly 
referred to influence of the High Representative on CFSP decision-making. For example, in 
Council Decision 2015/1763/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Burundi this was 
stated clearly: ‘Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’. This implies that the High Representative does in fact 
influence EU foreign policy. However, the findings do not indicate a more norm-driven stance 
towards the use of economic sanctions. 
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7. Conclusion 
This study focuses on the EU’s use of economic power in order to contribute to current 
knowledge on EU foreign policy behaviour. In doing so, it touches upon two ongoing debates. 
The first debate (between functionalists and intergovernmentalists) is concerned with the EU’s 
‘actorness’ in international politics. The second debate (between constructivists and realists) 
focuses on EU foreign policy objectives. The different paradigms disagree on the extent to 
which EU foreign policy objectives are driven by liberal-democratic norms and values in 
relation to member state security interests. This article therefore examined how the EU’s 
economic sanctions policy relates to the theoretical debate on EU foreign policy objectives. 
Accordingly, the central research question was: Does the European Union more often call upon 
normative or security related motives to justify its economic sanctions policy? 
In order to answer the research question, this study focused on all autonomous EU 
economic sanctions regimes that are currently in place. The results indicate that the EU uses 
economic sanctions for both security-related and normative reasons. The EU uses economic 
sanctions in order to preserve regional peace and stability, fight terrorism, support (ongoing) 
peace processes and support the non-proliferation of WMD’s. The EU has also sought to 
promote democracy and human rights in many instances. Hence, all six hypotheses were met. 
EU autonomous economic sanctions are predominantly vindicated by normative foreign policy 
objectives. Concerns about democracy and human rights led the EU to impose sanctions 
targeting other states in fourteen out of a total of twenty cases incorporated in this research. 
Even though security concerns also led the EU to impose economic sanctions, normative 
motives were more often used by the EU to justify economic sanctions. This indicates that the 
constructivist and functionalist schools of thought better explain the driving forces underlying 
current EU autonomous economic sanctions regimes.  
It makes sense that the formally stated goals are predominantly normative in nature since 
it is an easy way to make restrictive measures seem legitimate in the eyes of others. Still, the 
actual policy goals can differ from the formally stated ones because there is no clear insight in 
the actual decision-making process in the Council of Ministers. The results contribute more to 
the EU foreign policy debate than the EU decision-making debate for the same reason, even 
though theory was used in order to connect the main paradigms in both debates. Also, one 
should remain modest in generalizing the findings of this study as only twenty sanctions 
regimes were incorporated in the research. Despite the fact that all current autonomous 
economic sanctions were included, it is possible that the results are merely a snapshot of a 
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specific time. However, the findings give valuable insights in the EU’s current economic 
sanctions regimes and the objectives they seek to achieve. 
In light of future research it must be added that geography could be of influence on EU 
foreign policy objectives. Whereas some of the directly security related objectives fixate on 
states on the EU’s doorstep (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and Russia), indirectly security 
related objectives led to the imposition of sanctions with a wider geographical scope. It is not 
unlikely that security considerations are more important in cases close to the EU’s borders. 
Also, as stated before, EU economic sanctions in support of UN sanctions or UN Security 
Council resolutions were not incorporated in the study. This might have influenced the results 
considering that EU autonomous sanctions are only instated in cases were the Security Council 
is prevented from taking action due to a lack of agreement. Additional research on UN sanctions 
practice might therefore not only give valuable insights in UN sanctions objectives, but also in 
the relation between UN and EU sanctions policy. 
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Appendix: EU sanctions regimes in chronological order 
China (27-6-1989) 
Objectives: Human Rights 
Council document: N.a. 
Haiti (30-5-1994) 
Objectives: N.a. 
Council document: 1994/315/CFSP 
Montenegro (13-6-1994) 
Objectives: N.a. 
Council document: 1994/366/CFSP 
Serbia (13-6-1994) 
Objectives: N.a. 
Council document: 1994/366/CFSP 
Myanmar (28-10-1996) 
Objectives: Human Rights, Democracy 
Council document: 1996/635/CFSP 
Terrorism (27-12-2001) 
Objectives: Terrorism 
Council document: 2001/931/CFSP 
Zimbabwe (18-2-2002) 
Objectives: Human Rights, Democracy 
Council document: 2002/145/CFSP 
Moldova (27-2-2003) 
Objectives: Regional Peace and Stability 
Council document: 2003/139/CFSP 
Belarus (24-9-2004) 
Objectives: Human Rights, Democracy 
Council document: 2004/661/CFSP 
Libya (14-10-2004) 
Objectives: N.a. 
Council document: 2004/698/CFSP 
Guinea (27-10-2009) 
Objectives: Human Rights, Democracy 
Council document: 2009/788/CFSP 
Tunisia (13-1-2011) 
Objectives: Human Rights, Democracy 
Council document: 2011/72/CFSP 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina (21-3-2011) 
Objectives: Regional Peace and Stability, Peace Process 
Council document: 2011/173/CFSP 
Egypt (21-3-2011) 
Objectives: Human Rights, Democracy 
Council document: 2011/172/CFSP 
Iran (12-4-2011) 
Objectives: Human Rights  
Council document: 2011/235/CFSP 
Syria (9-5-2011) 
Objectives: Human Rights  
Council document: 2011/273/CFSP 
Syria (13-12-2013) 
Objectives: WMD’s, Human Rights  
Council document: 2013/760/CFSP 
Ukraine (5-3-2014) 
Objectives: Regional Peace and Stability, Human Rights  
Council document: 2014/119/CFSP 
Ukraine (17-3-2014) 
Objectives: Regional Peace and Stability 
Council document: 2014/145/CFSP 
Ukraine (23-6-2014) 
Objectives: Regional Peace and Stability 
Council document: 2014/386/CFSP 
Russia (31-7-2014) 
Objectives: Regional Peace and Stability 
Council document: 2014/512/CFSP 
Russia (22-6-2015) 
Objectives: Regional Peace and Stability, Peace Process 
Council document: 2015/971/CFSP 
Burundi (1-10-2015) 
Objectives: Peace Process, Human Rights, Democracy 
Council document: 2015/1763/CFSP 
Venezuela (13-11-2017) 
Objectives: Human Rights, Democracy 
Council document: 2017/2074/CFSP 
Myanmar (26-4-2018) 
Objectives: Human Rights 
Council document: 2018/655/CFSP 
